Relevant publications to date by the members of the project:
GARCÍA RODRÍGUEZ, forthcoming:
“Expression and the transparency of belief”, European Journal of Philosophy.
GARCÍA RODRÍGUEZ, 2018:
“Fake barns and our epistemological theorizing”, Crítica, 50, 29-53.
GARCÍA RODRÍGUEZ, 2018:
“Direct perceptual access to other minds”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 28/1, 24-39.
SAWYER, 2015:
“Contrastive Self-Knowledge and the McKinsey Paradox”, in S. Goldberg (ed.) Externalism, Self-Knowledge and Skepticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
FERNÁNDEZ, 2015:
“Précis of Transparent Minds” and “Replies to my critics”, Teorema, XXXIV/1
SAWYER, 2015:
“Contrastivism and Anti-Individualism Part II: A Further Reply to Aikin and Dabay”, Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4, no. 2, 10-12.
SAWYER, 2014:
“Contrastivism and Anti-Individualism: A Response to Aikin and Dabay”, Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3, no. 9, 1-6.
SAWYER, 2014:
“Contrastive self-knowledge”, Social Epistemology, 28, 139-152.
FERNÁNDEZ, 2013:
Transparent minds: a study of self-knowledge, Oxford University Press.
GARCÍA RODRÍGUEZ, 2013:
“Expression and transparency in contemporary work on self-knowledge”, European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 9/2, 67-81.
GARCÍA RODRÍGUEZ, 2013:
“A Wittgensteinian conception of animal minds”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 88, 101-122.
GARCÍA RODRÍGUEZ, 2012:
“How to be an expressivist about avowals today”, Nordic Wittgenstein Review, 1, 81-101.
FINKELSTEIN, 2012:
“From transparency to expressivism”, in Günter Abel and James Conant (eds.) Rethinking Epistemology. De Gruyter, 101-118.
FINKELSTEIN, 2010:
“Expression and avowal”, in K. Jolley (ed.) Wittgenstein: key concepts. Durham: Acumen, 185-198.
FINKELSTEIN, 2003:
Expression and the inner, Harvard University Press.
SAWYER, 1999:
“An externalist account of introspective knowledge”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 80, 358-378.